This regime begin in an embryonic way at the beginning of the 1990s of the last century, as a result of the defeat of the Iraqi army in Kuwait, and because of the American desire, under the auspices of the administration of Bush Senior and the Clinton administration, to blockade the regime of Saddam Hussein and not to overthrow it. This regime has currently become constitutional and legal, in light of the new Iraqi situation.
 The regional Kurdish government has taken advantage of the Iraqi constitution, which provides for federalism, in order to expand its capabilities and its powers at the expense of the central government. It has continually announced that it is a part of "democratic, federal, united Iraq." However, this government, at the same time, has not taken into consideration the debate and the differences pertaining to this constitutional article. It has begun to conclude deals with foreign companies to exploit the oil of the north without hesitating in the face of the reservations of the central government. It has set about to expand Kurdish diplomatic representation in Iraqi missions or on their margins. It has strengthened the role of the local police, the border guard, and the pesh merga independently of the central authority.
 It was possible that the pressure of these steps, which are supervised by the president of the regional government, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Mas'ūd Barazani, would be heavier in Iraqi political life and arouse opposition, if the Iraqi presidency had not been allotted to the leader of the Kurdistan National Union, Jalal Talabani, and the leadership of the Iraqi diplomacy allotted to the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Hushiyar Zibari.
 In this sense, the steps to establish Kurdish autonomy did not assume all of their Iraqi meanings and dimensions, or at least, the Iraqi parties that are opposed to Kurdish unilateralism have not been able to openly declare their positions. because of their need to ally with the Kurds on the central level, and subsequently to comply with the steps that they were bold enough to take in the region. and which tend more and more toward independence from the center, which is imposed by the fait accompli, if the texts do not impose it yet.
 However, what is happening in Iraq, with its weak central authority, and what is happening in the Kurdistan region, which is increasing in authority and power, is subjected to the microscope of the regional neighborhood, where Kurdish minorities live and which are striving to extract cultural and national demands. Kurdish national autonomy in Iraq has found itself in a direct or indirect confrontation with this neighborhood, which is not known for its toleration and understanding of Kurdish demands. This neighborhood is suspicious of the Kurdish experiment in Iraq and it is striving to prevent "its Kurds" from being affected by it and making it a model to be imitated as a minimum. Likewise, it is striving to prevent it from repeating itself in the neighborhood with force if circumstances require.
 It does not appear, until now, that the Kurdish officials in Iraq are interested in dispelling this ambiguity, if the declarations of some of them have not fueled it. Perhaps one of the basic aspects of the current crisis with Turkey lies here. The difficulty in convincing Ankara to avoid direct military action that targets activists of the Kurdistan National Workers' Party inside Iraq also lies here. It also aims to put an end to the expansion of Kurdish autonomy in the north of this country.
 The political pretext that is offered by the leaders of the Kurds in Iraq , in this crisis, says that they are not concerned with the problem of the Kurdish Workers Party, because of the fact that it is an internal Turkish problem However this pretext adds that military actions against partisans of this party in Iraq will not solve the problem, with the evidence that the violent confrontation between the Turkish authorities and this party, which has been flaring up for over two decades, has not put an end to the problem, that is, the solution in the view of those leaders must be political, and the initiative regarding it must be from Ankara, meaning that the Turkish authorities make an offer that is accepted by the Kurdistan Workers Party to end its armed rebellion.  
 This pretext could be correct, if Iraq were not under occupation and its central authority were not weak to the extent that it at the gates of Kurdish autonomy. If this regime were not in a state of expansion, politically and in terms of security, in the north of Iraq, and if the Kurdistan Workers' Party was not taking for itself a rear base in the region that has become known for ambiguities and the fears that it arouses in the neighborhood. The denial of the Kurdish leaders in Iraq of any relation with the current crisis, for tactical reasons. does not nullify the fears of the developments in the region, and the fact that this region will be the theater of any Turkish war in Iraq. It does not nullify that the Kurds of Iraq are going to be in the center of its turmoil, and the damaging effects of it are gong to affect them. Consequently, they are going to be concerned with it, and perhaps more than the partisan of the Kurdistan Workers' party who are spread out in the mountains of the region and who have nothing to lose, after having left their villages in Turkey. In this sense, it is in the interest of the Kurds in Iraq to launch an initiative to solve the current crisis, after the limited capacity of the central authorities in Baghdad to offer guarantees has been established. It is in their interest to work toward reassuring the neighborhood that their experiment in ruling is the result of development in modern Iraq, in war and in peace, and not a law that must be applied to the Kurds in Turkey, Syria, and Iran.

Abdullah Iskandar     Al-Hayat     - 28/10/07